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About the Milken Institute  
The Milken Institute is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank. For the past three decades, the 
Milken Institute has served as a catalyst for practical, scalable solutions to global challenges by 
connecting human, financial, and educational resources to those who need them. Guided by a 
conviction that the best ideas, under-resourced, cannot succeed, we conduct research and 
analysis and convene top experts, innovators, and influencers from different backgrounds and 
competing viewpoints. We leverage this expertise and insight to construct programs and policy 
initiatives. These activities are designed to help people build meaningful lives in which they can 
experience health and well-being, pursue effective education and gainful employment, and 
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Large tech companies and their customer-centric business models have led to gains in efficiency 
that have benefitted consumers and businesses worldwide. At the same time, the cross-sectoral 
nature of these companies exposes the world to new forms of risk by linking traditionally 
independent sectors, either directly by doing business in them or indirectly by providing 
infrastructure to third parties. If unmonitored, these risks could accumulate and destabilize the 
financial system, markets, and, more broadly, societies. 
 
So far, regulators and legislators' responses focus on data privacy, antitrust, cybersecurity and 
financial stability issues. These issues are not new. European Union regulators have been 
focusing on some of them for quite some time. The European Commission has announced a 
major overhaul of the current EU’s legal framework, the Digital Services Act package, which will 
include imposing rules on platforms indispensable for companies to reach consumers and 
access online markets. The novelty for 2021 is that the US and China have recently entered the 
regulatory arena too. It matters as both countries are home to most of the largest Tech 
companies. 
This report summarizes the recent key regulatory changes in the US, Europe, and China. It shows 
these jurisdictions have different regulatory approaches while being confronted with similar 
challenges. They all seek the right regulatory balance between: 
 promoting market efficiency while minimizing antitrust issues, 
 strengthening financial inclusion while ensuring financial stability, and 
 improving consumers' welfare while limiting data usage misconduct. 
 
But can these approaches be reconciled under the umbrella of an inclusive and flexible global 
framework?  
 
While global coordination seems unlikely on many policy issues such as antitrust or government 
access to data, it works for technical standards. The coherence they bring to the regulatory 
landscape will benefit all countries, consumers, and firms.  
We identify data sharing as a necessary technical standard to restore consumer choice and 
strengthen competition in tech companies' different economic sectors. We define data sharing 
as the combination of (i) data portability, (ii) platforms' interoperability, and (iii) data reciprocity.   
In highly innovative markets such as those in the digital space, these requirements ensure low 
entry barriers. They also provide convenient and cost-effective alternatives to customers, 
allowing them to sanction firms' poor behavior or quality of services by switching to another. 





The 15-month period beginning in January 2020 marks a turning point in the US and China's 
regulatory approach to tech companies, including BigTech. Their initial laissez-faire approach 
favored these companies' growth, focusing on the positive spillovers their innovation had on the 
population and the countries' economy. However, recent scandals, especially regarding data 
mismanagement and privacy issues, shifted public opinion in both countries, triggering a 
change in regulatory stance. 
For the first time, Europe, the US, and China share similar concerns regarding large tech 
companies' activities. They all seek the right regulatory balance that will help them develop 
digital and physical infrastructure while supporting healthy competition. This combination will 
facilitate financial inclusion while strengthening the financial systems’ resilience and improve 
consumer welfare while protecting consumer data. 
So far, each jurisdiction has developed its regulatory approach without global coordination. At 
the same time, tech companies' expansion has grown beyond their home countries’ jurisdictions. 
Pursuing this segmented global regulatory trend can only become counterproductive, especially 
in achieving sustainable and equitable economic growth. While policy coordination seems 
unlikely on antitrust issues or government access to data, there is a need and space for global 
technical standards.  
This report identifies data sharing as a necessary technical standard to restore customer choice 
and strengthen competition in the different economic sectors tech companies are entering. Data 
sharing has to be a convenient, cost-effective, and safe process to migrate personal data. 
Customers could then sanction firms' poor behavior or quality of services by switching to 
another service provider. By freeing the consumers' choices, data sharing enhances competition 
and innovation. For this to occur, the customers should be able to move their personal data and 
obtain similar services on other platforms, and in some sectors, from other service providers. In 
other words, effective data sharing requires data portability, digital platform interoperability, and 
in some sectors, data reciprocity. We discuss these notions further in the section “Data Sharing 
Requires Portability, Interoperability, and Reciprocity.” 
 
We first summarize the recent key regulatory changes in the US, Europe, and China toward large 
digital platforms.1 Then, we identify three categories of challenges that countries have, and will 
continue to face, when regulating digital platforms and other tech companies driving the 
economy's digitalization: (i) market structure, which includes the trade-off between market 
efficiency and antitrust issues; (ii) access to capital, which includes the trade-off between 
financial inclusion and financial stability; and (iii) consumer experience, which includes the trade-
off between the consumer welfare and data usage misconduct. This classification helps to clarify 
the policies' impact and emphasizes the importance of data and their portability. Finally, we 
                                                 
1. See Figure 1 & https://miresearch.github.io/Tech-Regulation/ for an up-to-date timeline of the major regulatory milestones of 
each jurisdiction.  
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discuss the requirements that will enable customers to share their data effectively across digital 
platforms or service providers: data portability, digital platforms’ interoperability, and data 




Three Approaches to Tech-Related Regulation  
 
Most of the US, Europe, and China initiatives target large tech companies, Big Tech, as direct 
responses to the disruptions they have caused in several sectors. It is also a reaction to their size 
and atypical business models. These companies have access to large amounts of customers' 
data, benefit from positive network effects derived from their platform's size, and derive a 
unique understanding of their customers' behaviors and preferences from their interwoven 








Since their creation, large tech companies in the US have invested, innovated, and operated with 
minimal interference from the federal government. However, recent concerns related to their 
size and power in different markets have reignited a debate on antitrust enforcement.  
 
The consumer welfare standard has defined the application of US antitrust law since the late 
1970s. It qualifies anti-competitive conduct as leading to lowered economic prospects for 
consumers, usually seen through higher prices (Wu 2018). Such an interpretation of antitrust 
"underappreciates the risk of predatory pricing and how integration across distinct business 
lines may prove anti-competitive" (Khan 2017). As an alternative, recent initiatives from the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Department of Justice (DOJ), and state attorneys general have 
focused on the impact of BigTech's conduct on consumers regarding the quality and innovation 
of its services. For example, in December 2020, the FTC and 48 state attorneys general filed a 
lawsuit claiming that Facebook's acquisition of Instagram and WhatsApp was anti-competitive 
as it limits the quality and innovation of social network advertising (FTC 2020). Similarly, the 
Antitrust Subcommittee produced a report in October 2020 that notes the quality of data 
privacy measures offered by companies such as Facebook is weaker due to a lack of 
competition.2 Over the past two years, the US antitrust regulators have investigated or charged 
Facebook, Google, and Amazon with anti-competitive conduct.3  
 
The Cambridge Analytica data scandal in March 2018 undeniably contributed to bringing broad 
awareness of the challenges related to consumer data treatment and protection. It led to 
widespread condemnation of Facebook's behavior from US legislators that resulted in its CEO's 
appearance before two separate Congressional hearings and several fines from the FTC—the de 
facto US privacy regulator—and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).4 
 
This scandal led to the strengthening of a few states' consumer data protection rules, with many 
others still in the process of passing new legislation (see Figure 2). In July 2018, California passed 
the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), which gives the state’s citizens the right to: 1) 
request a record of their personal data; 2) request companies delete their personal information; 
3) opt out of the sale of personal information; and 4) access their data in a readily available 
format that allows for transfer to third parties. In May 2019, Nevada also passed a data privacy 
law. The only similarity the Nevada Privacy Law and CCPA have is the provision giving its citizens 
                                                 
2. “Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets,” US House Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law of 
the Committee on the Judiciary, October 6, 2020, https://judiciary.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=3429. 
3. Facebook has been charged by the FTC and 48 state attorneys general; Amazon is under investigation by the FTC; Google has 
been charged in three separate cases by the DOJ and a variety of state attorneys general.  
4. The FTC’s investigation resulted in a $5 billion fine against Facebook in July 2019. The company also agreed to a separate $100 
million settlement with the SEC over claims it misled investors regarding the thoroughness of its privacy processes.  
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the right to opt out of the sale of their personal information.5 In June 2019, Maine passed a 







Comprehensive data privacy legislation remains a patchwork at the state level while a federal 
law is wholly absent. Despite several attempts to pass legislation since March 2018, two main 
issues have prevented bipartisan support for legislation: 1) whether federal privacy legislation 
would preempt (supersede) existing state privacy laws and 2) whether individuals would have 
the right to sue companies over alleged privacy violations. The first point became even more 
                                                 
5. “The Nevada Privacy Law (SB-220) vs. The California Consumer Act (CCPA),” One Trust, September 17, 2019, 
https://www.onetrust.com/blog/the-nevada-privacy-law-sb-220-vs-the-california-consumer-privacy-act-ccpa/. 




contentious when California amended the CCPA with stricter privacy rules for companies: the 
California Privacy Rights Act (CRPA), passed in November 2020 (Kerry and Chin 2020). 
 
In the absence of federal standards, several large US technology companies, including Microsoft, 
have decided to use the CCPA standards for all US consumers rather than just in California.7  
 
The US population supports these data privacy changes. In 2019, 70 percent of survey 
respondents felt they did not benefit in any meaningful way from the data collected about them 
and that more government regulation of data privacy was needed (see Figures 3 and 4). This 
trend has strengthened in recent years: In January 2021, 57 percent of US adults favored 
increased regulation for Amazon, Google, and Facebook, a nine-point increase compared to 
August 2019 (see Figure 5).  
 
The July 2020 congressional hearing of the CEOs from Amazon, Google, Facebook, and Apple 
sent a clear signal regarding enhanced scrutiny to come. In March 2021, Tim Wu's appointment 
as the head of technology and competition policy at the National Economic Council and the 
nomination of Lina Khan as a commissioner at the Federal Trade Commission confirmed that 
trend with the Biden administration.8 Both Wu and Khan are vocal critics of the behavior of 




                                                 
7. Jule Brill,  “Microsoft Will Honor California’s New Privacy Rights throughout the United States,” Microsoft, November 11, 2019, 
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/11/11/microsoft-california-privacy-rights/. 
8. “President Biden Announces His Intent to Nominate Lina Khan for Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission,” The White 
House, March 22, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/22/president-biden-announces-
his-intent-to-nominate-lina-khan-for-commissioner-of-the-federal-trade-commission/. 









Finally, Big Tech's expansion to financial services has recently led to more scrutiny from the 
sector's regulators. Initially, Big Tech became partners with incumbent financial institutions for 
activities that require entity-specific licensing, attracting very little interest from the regulators. 
For example, Apple partnered with Green Dot Bank to release its peer-to-peer payment service 
Apple Cash in December 2017 and with Goldman Sachs to release a credit card in August 2019. 
Google announced in August 2020 that it would be partnering with eight different banks and 
credit unions to offer checking and savings accounts in 2021, including Citi, BMO, and BBVA.10 
Since 2018, Amazon has partnered with Synchrony Bank, Bank of America, and American Express 
to offer various lending services to small businesses.11   
  
But things changed with Facebook's Libra project, a digital currency pegged to the value of a fiat 
currency basket. It triggered a decisive reaction from regulators. In 2019, both the Fed and SEC 
expressed concern over the project.  
 
The SEC wanted to understand whether Libra should be subject to its oversight and approval 
due to its close resemblance to an actively managed exchange-traded fund (ETF). Indeed, the 
                                                 
10. “Google to Offer Co-branded Accounts with Eight US Banks,” Finextra, August 3, 2020, 
https://www.finextra.com/newsarticle/36330/google-to-offer-co-branded-accounts-with-eight-us-banks. 




Libra white paper proposed using a group of authorized resellers to control the liquidity of the 
basket fiat currencies in the Libra Reserve.12 This approach seemed similar to the authorized 
participants that control ETF shares' supply to represent the underlying securities' value.13 
  
The Fed focused on the potential impact of Libra on the financial system's stability. Unlike other 
cryptocurrencies that have a limited number of users, Facebook's platform could create 
widespread adoption. In that case, a mass exodus of deposits could create adverse effects for 
incumbent financial institutions and on the broader financial system if a lapse in operational 
resilience caused a significant redemption event (FSB 2020).  
 
As of March 2021, Libra—now renamed Diem—will no longer be pegged to a basket of fiat 






Europe has been widely credited as the standard-bearer of Big Tech regulation.14 Beginning with 
Google in 2010, the European Commission (EC)—the bloc's executive body—has opened 
antitrust investigations into and brought charges against all the major US technology companies 
over alleged anti-competitive conduct. Penalty enforcement has come in the form of large fines 
and, in some cases, a mandated change to the company's policy or conduct. For example, the 
three antitrust cases brought against Google between 2010 and 2019 resulted in over $9 billion 
in fines and, among other things, led to a change in how Google treats rivals in search 
advertising.15 To deal with data privacy and protection issues, the EU passed the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) in April 2016. Since becoming effective in May 2018, the GDPR has 
regulated how companies treat user data and give Europeans more control over whether their 
data are sold or shared. Notably, the GDPR was used to fine Google $56 million in January 2019 
over its failure to adequately disclose to users how data are collected.16  
 
Yet European regulators' success in pursuing anti-competitive conducts of Big Tech companies 
did not significantly improve competition. For example, the European Competition 
Commissioner Margrethe Vestager conceded in November 2019 that the outcome of the first 
antitrust case against Google did not result in more traffic for rival shopping price comparison 
                                                 
12 Libra White Paper. 2019. https://www.diem.com/en-us/white-paper/  
13. Dave Michaels and Lalita Clozel, “SEC Weighs Whether to Regulate Facebook’s Libra,” The Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2019, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-weighs-whether-to-regulate-facebooks-libra-11563015601. 
14. Sarah Lyall, “Who Strikes Fear into Silicon Valley? Margrethe Vestager, Europe’s Antitrust Enforcer,” The New York Times, May 5, 
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/05/world/europe/margrethe-vestager-silicon-valley-data-privacy.html. 
15. Aofie White, “After $9 Billion in Fines, EU Says Something Nice about Google,” Bloomberg, September 16, 2020, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-16/after-9-billion-in-fines-eu-says-something-nice-about-google. 




companies.17  Former officials have also pointed to Google's unchanged share of the broader 
search engine market as evidence of a sub-optimal outcome for European regulators.18 Google's 
share of the European search engine market has remained at more than 90 percent since the 







The GDPR compliance costs have been particularly prohibitive for small and medium-sized 
businesses. As a result, some firms have limited their digital advertising purchases to Big Tech 
firms, trusting their ability to comply with the new rules and future changes.19 Public opinion has 
also been mixed on the effectiveness of GDPR: One year after the introduction of GDPR, almost 
half of those surveyed in the UK felt that the legislation had made no difference to them, while 
17 percent claimed it had made their experience with companies using their data worse (see 
Figure 7). Another survey shows that UK adults were among the most active in their use of GDPR 
data rights, with 19 percent of adults responding that they had exercised their right to data 
portability, compared with just 13% across all 28 European countries (see Figure 8).    
 
                                                 
17. Foo Yun Chee and Victoria Waldersee, “EU’s Vestager Says Google’s Antitrust Proposal Not Helping Shopping Rivals,” Reuters, 
November 7, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-alphabet-antitrust/eus-vestager-says-googles-antitrust-proposal-not-
helping-shopping-rivals-idUSKBN1XH2I8. 
18. Tommaso Valletti, “How It Started… How It’s Going,” Twitter, October 16, 2020, 
https://twitter.com/TomValletti/status/1317110154328932353. 









Stalled progress led to a new regulatory toolkit in December 2020 that comes in two parts:  
1. The Digital Services Act (DSA) deals with the liability of information posted on digital 
platforms and tasks platform providers with ensuring content posted on their sites is not 
harmful to users. The DSA modernizes existing EU liability provisions and clarifies legal 
ambiguities, particularly related to illegal content and bots' use to influence elections (EC 
2020). 
2. The Digital Markets Act (DMA) focuses on enabling competition by regulating the 
conduct of so-called digital gatekeepers—companies that, among other things, have an 
annual turnover above €6.5 billion and at least 45 million monthly active users in Europe 
(Blankertz and Jaursch 2021).  
 
Unlike existing EU antitrust law, the DMA's ex-ante framework obligates and prohibits digital 
gatekeepers' practices. As a result, large tech companies must proactively ensure that the 
whitelisted and blacklisted practices included in the DMA are met or face fines up to 10% of 
their total annual turnover, see Figure 9 (EC 2020). However, the EU's ex-ante approach to 
antitrust raises concerns. With rules based on companies' size and not behavior, it would unfairly 
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target large US companies, violating World Trade Organization rules and having a chilling effect 






In the absence of an alternative, the GDPR provides a comprehensive framework for other 
jurisdictions to follow. Yet, countries around the globe have fundamental differences in how 
they approach data protection, making such a harmonization challenging. 
California's CCPA data protection legislation illustrates this point. On the one hand, GDPR and 
CCPA share key components, such as "giving individuals rights to access and delete their 
personal information, require transparency about information use and necessitate contracts 
between businesses and their service providers.”20 On the other hand, the GDPR highlights a 
fundamental difference between how the EU and US approach data protection, namely the 
extent to which national security concerns subordinate protection rules. The Court of Justice of 
the European Union’s (CJEU) decision in July 2020 exemplifies such a difference. It ruled that the 
EU-US Privacy Shield (an arrangement that facilitates data transfer between the two 
jurisdictions) no longer provides adequate rights for European users' data in the US equivalent 
to those included in the GDPR.21 Specifically, the ruling refers to the US government's access to 
user data for national security purposes as being incompatible with the rights included in the 
GDPR (Meltzer 2020). 
 
                                                 
20. Carol A. F. Umhoefer, “CCPA vs. GDPR: The Same, Only Different,” DLA Piper, April 11, 2019, 
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2019/04/ipt-news-q1-2019/ccpa-vs-gdpr/. 
21. Schrems and Facebook Ireland v Data Protection Commissioner, CJEU Case C-311/18, InfoCuria, July 16, 2020, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-311/18. 
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As an alternative to the EU-US Privacy Shield, companies can use special contracts, Standard 
Contractual Clauses, to transfer data between the two jurisdictions. More than 5,000 companies 
had to readjust their privacy policies due to the court's decision. While this new requirement 
may have had a limited impact on large companies such as Facebook, Google, and Amazon, it is 
not the case for 70 percent of the companies concerned—small and medium-sized businesses 






Over the past decade, Chinese regulators have prioritized Chinese technology companies' 
growth over regulatory oversight.23 From 2014 to 2020, the Chinese firms Alibaba and Tencent 
grew their monthly active users (MAUs) by 718 million and 817 million, respectively (see Figure 
10). This growth is primarily attributable to their domestic market. In comparison, Facebook and 




                                                 
22. Emily Birnbaum, “Tech Companies Are ‘Scrambling’ after the EU’s Top Court Shot Down the EU-US Privacy Shield,” Protocol, July 
16, 2020, https://www.protocol.com/privacy-shield-struck-down. 
23. Celia Chen, “China’s ‘Wild Era’ of Internet May Be Ending as New Personal Data Protection Law Seeks to Curb BigTech’s Control 
over User Data,” South China Morning Post, November 26, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/tech/policy/article/3111337/chinas-wild-era-
internet-may-be-ending-new-personal-data-protection-law. 
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Financial services played a key role in both companies' growth by expanding their customer 
base to underserved or untapped populations. Their subsidiaries offer services in payments, 
money market funds, insurance, and credit to rural populations and small and medium-sized 
enterprises, making financial services more inclusive (BIS 2019; Frost et al. 2019). Ultimately, 
these developments have contributed to the Chinese economy's growth. 
Scandals related to Anbang and Tomorrow Group ushered in a new approach. They triggered a 
restructuring of Chinese financial regulatory oversight. Financial stability became the primary 
focus with three institutions in charge: the Central Bank, the Banking and Insurance Regulatory 
Commission, and the Securities Regulatory Commission.24 One of their first initiatives focused on 
the resilience of the fast-growing money-market fund market. Alibaba's fund had received 
widespread attention as the world's largest with $165 billion assets under management (AUM) 
in April 2017 (see Figure 11). The new rules set caps on consumers' withdrawals from money-





Data privacy issues became a focus of the government as it became clear that the Chinese 
public were dissatisfied with how frequently their data had been hacked, sold illegally, and 
leaked (Horsely 2021). In October 2020, after a year-long process, it introduced a comprehensive 
data privacy law. The Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) takes inspiration from both the 
EU and the US approaches to data governance—giving consumers greater data protection 
                                                 
24. Matthew Miller and Engen Tham, “China Seizes Control of Anbang Insurance as Chairman Prosecuted,” Reuters, February 22, 
2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-anbang-regulation/china-seizes-control-of-anbang-insurance-as-chairman-
prosecuted-idUSKCN1G7076; Alexandra Stevenson, “China Is Dismantling the Empire of a Vanished Tycoon,” The New York Times, 
July 18, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/18/business/china-xiao-jianhua.html. 
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rights while maintaining the government's surveillance rights for national security purposes (Lee 
2021). The government also directly targeted China's large tech companies by drafting a 
separate set of rules to limit mobile app providers' ability to collect user data.25  
 
Finally, the Chinese authorities implemented new antitrust legislation in November 2020, soon 
after a highly critical speech toward Chinese financial regulators delivered by Alibaba Founder 
and Chairman Jack Ma at the Bund Summit in Shanghai (Zhang 2021). Less than two weeks after 
that speech, the planned IPO of Alibaba's subsidiary Ant Group was canceled.26 That same week, 
China's antitrust regulator—the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR)—drafted 
new anti-monopoly guidelines. Soon after, it began an investigation into Alibaba over alleged 
anti-competitive conduct.27 Since then, other Chinese Big Tech firms have been under 
investigation. SAMR fined Tencent, Baidu, and Alibaba for failing to report previous acquisition 
deals for approval.28 In January 2021, the Central Bank issued an antitrust directive that gave 
SAMR the authority to break up any non-bank financial institution with a market share greater 
than 50 percent, or 67 percent for two companies—a standard that Alibaba's Ant Group and 
Tencent's Tenpay both meet.29  
 
 
Commonalities in a Segmented Regulatory Landscape  
 
To date, regulators worldwide, including the US, Europe, and China, have differences in their 
regulatory approach to large tech companies, including Big Tech. Yet, moving forward, they will 
face similar challenges: finding the right balance between innovation-driven growth and 
regulation. The trade-offs are country-specific, based on physical and digital infrastructure 
needs, the level of capital access, population preferences, and the other country's needs.  
Below we sort the different policy challenges around three main questions:  
 How to promote market efficiency while minimizing antitrust issues? 
 How to strengthen financial inclusion while ensuring financial stability? 
 How to improve consumers' welfare while limiting data usage misconduct? 
 
Such a classification helps assess the impact of a policy holistically: A better understanding of 
the different dimensions may minimize unexpected consequences such as the initial negative 
                                                 
25. “China Drafts Rules on Mobile Apps’ Collection of Personal Data,” Reuters, December 1, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
china-cyber-apps/china-drafts-rules-on-mobile-apps-collection-of-personal-data-idUSKBN28B5CZ. 
26. Keith Zhai, Julie Zhu, and Cheng Leng, “How Billionaire Jack Ma Fell to Earth and Took Ant’s Mega IPO with Him,” Reuters, 
November 5, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/ant-group-ipo-suspension-regulators/how-billionaire-jack-ma-fell-to-earth-and-
took-ants-mega-ipo-with-him-idUSKBN27L2GX. 
27. Ryan McMorrow and Tom Mitchell, “Beijing Launches Antitrust Investigation into Alibaba,” The Financial Times, December 23, 
2020, https://www.ft.com/content/bdcc073f-3b70-4411-92d7-ee36973a8b7a. 
28. Stephanie Yang and Jing Yang, “China Regulator Fines Tencent, Baidu, Others over Investment Deals,” The Wall Street Journal, 
March 12, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-regulator-fines-tencent-baidu-others-over-investment-deals-11615553409. 
29. “Market Share of Leading Third-Party Mobile Payment Providers in China in 2019,” Statista, accessed March 1, 2021. 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/323473/china-leading-third-party-mobile-payment-providers/.  
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impact of GDPR on small and medium-sized businesses. Finally, it emphasizes how important 





Market Structure: Market Efficiency and Antitrust  
Large tech companies are often credited for bringing efficiencies to domestic markets by 
developing the necessary infrastructure to lower costs and improve the quality of goods and 
services. Their ability to invest large amounts of capital into new technologies, such as artificial 
intelligence and machine learning, allows them to increase their offering of products and 
services while controlling the associated costs (Zingales and Lancieri 2019; Digital Competition 
Expert Panel 2019). There are numerous illustrations. Alibaba was essential in expanding the 
freight and logistics infrastructure to rural China, which was necessary to gain access to their 
mostly untapped consumer base (IIF 2018). In the US, cloud computing services lower costs for 
existing firms, including small and medium-sized businesses, leading to greater flexibility and 
scalability in their business models (FSB 2019; Stigler Committee on Digital Platforms 2019; 
Digital Competition Expert Panel 2019). 
 
However, the companies' dominant position in some markets raises concerns. The lack of 
alternatives may lead to a systemic failure in case of disruption; this is especially relevant in the 
context of financial stability, as discussed in the next paragraph. Other antitrust issues include 
killer acquisitions (Digital Competition Expert Panel 2019), limitations of consumer freedom, and 
manipulations of the consumer decision-making process (Zingales and Lancieri 2019).  
Capital Access: Financial Inclusion and Financial Stability  
Large tech companies' access to consumers' data from e-commerce or search engines and their 
ability to include it in their assessment of customers' credit risk, among other things, allows 
them to provide financial services to the untapped or underserved population. MercadoLibre in 
Latin America, Alipay and WeChat in China, and M-Pesa in Africa illustrate how consumers can 
use smartphones and free internet access to open bank accounts, pay for goods electronically, 
and apply for loans. (BIS 2019; IIF 2018; Adrian and Mancini Griffoli 2019). In the US, Jagtiani and 
Lemieux (2019) find evidence that Lending Club provides better lending conditions to lower-
income borrowers than traditional lending channels.  
 
But financial inclusion goes hand in hand with financial stability. In the US, strategic partnerships 
between large tech companies and incumbent financial institutions raise concerns for several 
reasons. We saw previously that tech companies can provide a third-party service to a financial 
institution or offer a financial service through their digital platforms with a financial institution 
managing the back-end delivery. In both cases, a single disruption to the tech company, from a 
cyberattack or other event, could have downstream effects on the financial institutions, 
magnifying the risk to the broader financial ecosystem (FSB 2019; Allen, Gu, and Jagtiani 2021). 
Similarly, suppose these companies dominate financial services in some markets, such as 
20 
WeChat and Alipay in China. The lack of alternatives makes their failure a potential systemic risk 
(FSB 2019; IIF 2018).  
Consumer Experience: Consumer Welfare and Data Usage  
The contribution of digital platforms to both capital access and market structure relies on access 
and process of the data collected from the customer. The benefits are unquestionable: from 
increased capital access to lowering the remittance system's cost and increasing transaction 
speed (BIS 2019), and from helping compliance to identifying fraud and other criminal activities 
(IIF 2018).  
 
But as seen in the previous section, tech companies' usage and management of consumer data 
have concerned regulators for quite some time. The issues raised include digital 
authoritarianism, the spread of misinformation, cyberattacks, systematic bias in the financial 
services sector, data privacy, and data ownership rights (IIF 2018; Stigler Committee on Digital 











The competitive edge of digital platforms lies partly in the data they collect on their network. 
Defining ways to share those data in a useable form by other companies is at the heart of the 
solution. Data sharing promotes competition by reducing entry barriers to some markets and 
facilitating the switch between providers. It also empowers consumers by giving them more 
control over their data and fosters innovation in data-based services as it expands the pool of 
data a firm can access, independently of its size. 
For most policy initiatives, data portability is data sharing: allowing users to transfer their digital 
data (applications and personal data) created on one platform to another rival platform would 
give users more control and visibility over their data and freedom to switch services between 
22 
platforms. The EU GDPR, the US's CCPA, Australia's Consumer Data Right, India's Personal Data 
Protection Bill 2019, and Brazil's Article 18 all have a data-portability clause.  
Large tech companies in the US are also interested in data portability. In 2018, Facebook, 
Twitter, Apple, Google, and Microsoft started the Data Transfer Project, whose goal is to "create 
an open-source, service-to-service data portability platform so that all individuals across the 
web could easily move their data between online service providers whenever they want."30 It is 
still a work in progress. 
In a customer-centric environment, the data sharing process needs to focus on the consumer 
experience to be successful. Its benefits, from freeing the consumers' choices to enhancing 
competition and innovation, will only occur if the consumers find the data migration convenient 
and safe. Digital platform interoperability is a necessary complement to data portability to 
ensure that. Interoperability is the extent to which one platform's infrastructure can work with 
others, ultimately providing the user comparable services with the same data. It reduces the cost 
of losing one network (friends, audience, customers), making the switch to other platforms 
easier. As Representative Ken Buck of Colorado, the Ranking Member on the House Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law, stated, "interoperability is a 
time-honored practice in the tech industry that allows competing technologies to speak to one 
another so that consumers can make a choice without being locked into any one technology." 
The subcommittee’s report identifies both digital platforms interoperability and data portability 
as requirements. 31 
 
Finally, in some sectors, data reciprocity needs to complement data portability. Indeed, the 
traditional boundaries between sectors do not apply to digital markets. Tech firms may offer 
personalized products, such as a loan or utility package, based on the consumer behavior of its 
e-commerce platform, search engine, or social media network. Introduced in Australia Open 
Banking, data reciprocity forces any accredited data recipient to share comparable data with 
rivals at the consumers' request. Reciprocity gives banks and other financial institutions access 
to the non-financial data tech companies have. This symmetric access to customer data, at 
his/her request, facilitates competitors' emergence (Diporto and Ghidini 2020). It also forces 
non-tech companies to develop or acquire the tools necessary to analyze the data, supporting 
competition in data-processing innovation effectively. 
 
  
                                                 
30  Data Transfer Project, Accessed March 31, 2021.https://datatransferproject.dev/ 




The digitalization of the economy has put customer data at the center of most business models 
leading to positive outcomes worldwide, including providing greater financial access to 
underserved populations and supporting the growth of small and medium‐sized businesses. 
Until recently, governments have focused on the economic growth generated by digital markets; 
now they need to ensure its sustainability and equitability. More specifically, this fast-evolving 
environment requires regulatory agility to balance competing priorities such as market efficiency 
and competition, financial inclusion and financial stability, consumer welfare and data usage. 
Large digital platforms have played a key role in transforming different economic sectors, 
directly or indirectly. Customers relied on them as they believed they were trustworthy while 
enjoying their digital services' convenience, effectiveness, and affordability. However, recent 
scandals related to data misconduct forced customers and authorities worldwide to recognize 
and understand the amount of information accumulated by these companies and the related 
risks.  
As a result, the US, Europe, and China, among others, have strengthened their regulatory 
scrutiny. Their approaches differ based on their specificities, such as economic development, 
economic structure, and local preferences.  
Pursuing this regulatory trend without any international coordination will create a segmented 
regulatory system. At the same time, tech companies continue to expand their activities beyond 
each jurisdiction's borders. This situation may inhibit the economic and social spillover tech 
companies tend to generate. Many differences between these jurisdictions, and others, cannot 
be bridged, making actual policy coordination an unrealistic goal. However, cross-border 
consistency in technical standards is a realistic goal and would benefit all: countries, populations, 
and companies/private sector. If done well, these technical standards will have positive effects 
on issues related to data privacy, competition, and innovation. 
 
This report identifies data sharing as a necessary technical standard to restore customer choice 
and strengthen competition in the different economic sectors tech companies are entering. We 
define data sharing as the combination of data portability, platforms' interoperability, and data 
reciprocity. In highly innovative markets, such as the digital ones, these requirements ensure low 
entry barriers. They also provide convenient and cost-effective alternatives to customers, 
allowing them to sanction firms' poor behavior or quality of services by switching to another. 





Appendix: Timeline of Regulatory Milestone in China, Europe, and the US 
 
China Europe United States 
10/2017: China's 19th National 
Congress makes organizational 
changes to its financial regulatory 
body after scandals. 
5/2017: EU antitrust regulator 
issues $122 million fine against 
Facebook. 
3/2018: Facebook's 
Cambridge Analytica data 
scandal.  
6/2018: People's Bank of China 
introduces cap on redemptions for 
money-market funds. 
6/2017: EU antitrust regulator 
issues $2.7 billion fine against 
Google. 
7/2019: U.S. FTC fines 
Facebook $5 billion over 
mishandling users' personal 
information. 
10/2020: China introduces new 
data privacy law. 
3/2018: Facebook's Cambridge 
Analytica data scandal.  
7/2019: Facebook's Libra 
cryptocurrency receives 
criticism from U.S. financial 
regulators. 
11/2020: Planned IPO of Ant 
Group is suspended by Chinese 
government. 
5/2018: EU data privacy law is 
implemented. 
1/2020: California's data 
privacy law is implemented. 
11/2020: China proposes new 
antitrust laws. 
7/2018: EU antitrust regulator 
issues $5 billion fine against 
Google. 
7/2020: U.S. House 
Subcommittee on Antitrust 
holds hearing for U.S Big Tech 
CEO's. 
12/2020: China fines Alibaba & 
Tencent over antitrust violations. 
1/2019: Google fined $57 million 
under EU's GDPR 
8/2020: U.S. FTC + State AG's 
begin antitrust investigation 
into Amazon. 
1/2021: China's Central Bank 
issues new antitrust rules. 
3/2019: EU antitrust regulator 
issues $1.7 billion fine against 
Google. 
10/2020: U.S Department of 
Justice + State AG's bring 
antitrust charges against 
Google. 
2/2021: Ant Group ordered to 
restructure as a financial holding 
company. 
7/2020: European court 
overturns $14.9 billion antitrust 
fine against Apple. 
12/2020: State AG's file two 
separate antitrust suits 
against Google. 
3/2021: China fines 12 companies 
over antitrust violations including 
Tencent & Baidu.  
8/2020: European Central Bank 
warns against the dependence of 
financial institutions on critical 
digital services.  
12/2020: U.S. FTC + State 
AG's bring antitrust charges 
against Facebook. 
 
11/2020: EU antitrust regulator 
charges Amazon.  
2/2021: State of Maryland 
imposes tax on revenue from 
digital advertisements.  
11/2020: UK Government unveil 
new Digital Markets Unit.  
 
 
11/2020: France imposes digital 




12/2020: EU's Digital Services Act 




 3/2021: UK antitrust regulator 
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